Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 2
Number 4 Volume 2, No. 4: November/
December 2009

Article 5

Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: The Threat of Terrorism and the
2010 Olympics
Serge E. Vidalis
Blue Force Global—Special Services Group Ltd. & University of British Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons,
and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons

pp. 53-60
Recommended Citation

Vidalis, Serge E.. "Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: The Threat of
Terrorism and the 2010 Olympics." Journal of Strategic Security 2, no. 4
(2010) : 53-60.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.5
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Extinguishing the Torch of Terror: The Threat of Terrorism and
the 2010 Olympics
Abstract
With the change in seasons comes the expected change of insurgency operations in
Afghanistan as Taliban and al-Qaida fighters mount their spring and summer offensives
against both NATO forces and Afghanis sympathetic to foreign troops. As insurgents curtail
their seasonal operations with the arrival of fall and winter, is it likely that a threat may
arise from Afghanistan to affect the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia? As will
be illustrated herein, the threat to the games will not be borne directly from the insurgency
in Afghanistan but rather by the universal jihadist ideology of al-Qaida rather than the
nationalist beliefs of their fellow fighters, the Taliban. This article aims to call attention to
the plausible threat to the 2010 Olympics posed by al-Qaida's far-reaching terrorist
network while also offering a focused threat analysis based on the network's preferred
tactics. Essentially, the power of al-Qaida lies in their network: the threat to the Olympic
Games stems from proxy extremist and terrorist groups linked directly and indirectly to alQaida.
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Extinguishing the Torch of Terror:
The Threat of Terrorism and the
2010 Olympics
By Serge E. Vidalis, CD, MA

"It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only possible attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive."
Colonel C.E. Callwell, 19061

Introduction
With the change in seasons comes the expected change of insurgency
operations in Afghanistan as Taliban and al-Qaida fighters mount their
spring and summer offensives against both NATO forces and Afghanis
sympathetic to foreign troops. As insurgents curtail their seasonal operations with the arrival of fall and winter, is it likely that a threat may arise
from Afghanistan to affect the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver, British
Columbia? As will be illustrated herein, the threat to the games will not be
borne directly from the insurgency in Afghanistan but rather by the universal jihadist ideology of al-Qaida rather than the nationalist beliefs of
their fellow fighters, the Taliban. This article aims to call attention to the
plausible threat to the 2010 Olympics posed by al-Qaida's far-reaching
terrorist network while also offering a focused threat analysis based on
the network's preferred tactics. Essentially, the power of al-Qaida lies in
their network: the threat to the Olympic Games stems from proxy extremist and terrorist groups linked directly and indirectly to al-Qaida.

Nationalist vs. Universalist Terrorism
In his article "Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al-Qaida in Historical Perspective," Christopher J. Fettweis presents the typologies of terrorism as
consisting of two camps, nationalist and ideological terrorists. Clearly, the
Taliban fall into the nationalist camp as "their goals are territorial, usually
as part of an attempt to carve out a homeland from an existing state or
territory; their goals, therefore, have limited, rather than universal, application" and "target the interests of the perceived occupier of their territory."2 In contrast, ideological terrorists aim to "agitate on behalf of an
idea, not a people; they have no specific territorial aims; their goals have
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no natural restrictions; and, as a result, their targets can be drawn from
the universe of non-members, or non-believers in the cause."3 It is the latter of the two terror groups that pose a threat to the security and safety of
the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. To better appreciate the potential threat to
these games, a review of terrorist incidents from previous Olympic Games
may prove valuable.

Previous Terrorist Incidents and the Olympic Games
Since the start of the modern Olympics, there have been only two terrorist
events. The most infamous of these was the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics at the hands of Black September, a
radical offshoot of the Fatah party, the militant faction of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), then under the leadership of Yasser
Arafat. The birth of Black September came about by the expulsion and
deaths of thousands of militant Palestinians residing in Jordan who
fought for the return of their homeland. The purpose of Black September
was "to let the world know of its people's plight and pursue a penchant for
the destruction of Israel and Western interests" as retribution for their
displacement. According to John K. Cooley's book, Green March Black
September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs, published in 1973, the
organization was composed of numerous cells of militant followers, leaderless and dispersed throughout various regions of Europe and the world
living very ordinary lives yet participating in terrorist activities as opportunity afforded. Their actions during the 1972 Munich Olympics had two
purposes: to express to the world that the Palestinian people had been
abandoned and to strike at their archenemy, Israel.
From Munich two lessons were learned; the first confirmed the difficulties of counterterrorism operations to detect sympathizers and resistance
fighters who may reside in foreign countries and are committed to pursuing the organization's cause even though they are "decentralized" or effectively "leaderless." The second was that nationalist terrorist groups are
prone to attacking persons or interests representative of their fight. In
this case, the victims were innocent Israeli athletes.
Twenty-four years later during the Atlanta Summer Olympics of 1996, the
international community again witnessed an act of terror, an act of
domestic terrorism founded on the ideological beliefs of one man, Eric
Robert Rudolf. Rudolf, a former U.S. Army soldier, was eventually convicted for the death of one person at the Centennial Olympic Park by the
detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) and for three other
separate bombings in the Atlanta region. In a statement made by Rudolf
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in 2005, he charged that the government of the United States was implicit
in the deaths of infants by the legalization of abortion, and that the use of
force to stop these killings was justified. Also an affront to his beliefs was
his perception of the government's legitimization of homosexuality, which
he felt weakened the moral fiber of American society.4 The Atlanta Olympic bombing, in contrast to the Munich attack, demonstrated that ideologically motivated terrorists have "no boundaries and no end except the
annihilation of"5 competing ideas. Such terrorists believe that their
actions are an "awakening of the masses through violent example," and
hope that they "will inspire a broad movement against their ideological
enemy."6
No different than in previous years, the 2010 Olympics present a targetrich environment for terrorist groups, mainly because the games symbolize unity in the international community. In addition, many of participants in the games—including the host-nation Canada—are supporting
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The global radical jihadist
ideology embraced by al-Qaida and its international supporters presents a
unique challenge to domestic Canadian security forces; they must be prepared for an enemy that is experienced and battle-proven.

Ideological Perspective of al-Qaida
Understanding the ideological beliefs of al-Qaida is essential in understanding the threat that they may pose to the 2010 Olympics. Al-Qaida's
ideological dispensation can be traced to the late 1970s when its founder
Usama bin Ladin became the "unofficial" ambassador of Saudi Arabia to
Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort to aid Afghanistan in its fight
against the Soviets. A devoted supporter of the mujahideen, ibn Ladin
aided many fighters and commanders in their efforts with the jihad. The
Afghan jihad continued growing under the guidance of Abdullah Azzam
with "an international network of overseas branches linked by mobile
telephones, personal computers and lap-tops" where "in excess of 25,000
foreign jihadis are said to have passed . . . to the Mujahedeen."7
At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, ibn Ladin
offered his services to defend Saudi Arabia by offering his "global network
of ex-Afghanistan jihadists, beginning with several thousand Wahhabi
veterans now back in Saudi."8 Ibn Ladin's overture of support was refused
by the Saudi leadership, and ibn Ladin eventually fled the Kingdom to
consolidate al-Qaida in Sudan and later Afghanistan.
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In 1996 ibn Ladin offered his support to the Taliban in return for
protection in Afghanistan where he would renew his efforts of
establishing terror-training camps for future operations. By 1997, ibn
Ladin had issued his first fatwa, declaring it the "duty of all Muslims to
'kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military . . . in any
country in which it was possible.'"9 The fatwa was followed by the
bombings of the U.S. Embassy in East Africa and the USS Cole, instantly
creating the persona among young Muslim men in the umma that he was
the vanguard of "Resistance to Western Imperialism." These acts of terror
would propel ibn Ladin to the center stage of radical Muslims and
Western intelligence agencies alike.

Current Threat Environment: Decentralized
Terrorism and 'Lone Wolves'
Fast-forward to 2009: the once mighty and entrenched Taliban and alQaida terrorists in Afghanistan have been on the run for eight years. They
have largely sought refuge in familiar territory over the Afghan border in
the northern tribal regions of Pakistan; the very area where ibn Ladin
supported mujahideen insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1979–1989
Soviet campaign. Although there is no certainty that ibn Ladin is alive,
there has been speculation that his medical condition has prevented him
from resuming the leadership role he once performed. It is rumored that
one of his elder sons has assumed this role.
Regardless of whether ibn Ladin is dead or alive, the al-Qaida establishment has been shaken into a state that closely resembles what Fettweis
calls the stage of "decentralization," a phase that can precede the collapse
of terrorist organizations. In the case of al-Qaida, decentralization means
that splinter groups or "lone wolves" aim to carry out terrorist acts in the
name of al-Qaida. The al-Qaida network now appears to be a "leaderless
resistance"10 as described by Cooley in reference to the dispersal of Black
September sympathizers and fighters.
Such lone-wolf actors seek to become embedded within society and to
pursue their nefarious activities from within as so-called "homegrown terrorists." There are a number of Islamist and jihadist-inspired terrorist
groups that are believed to have a presence in Canada. A number of
groups and individuals have recently been discovered while preparing to
carry out terrorist attacks.11 Several of these terrorist suspects had established links to the al-Qaida network, acquired terror training overseas,
and/or acquired explosive material, resources, and components in pursuit
of their violent jihadist ideology. In the end, it is the lone wolves that must
56
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be feared during the 2010 Olympics for they are not "constrained by . . .
rational strategic limitations" and have "chosen the most-destructive
weapons available to inflict the maximum amount of damage on people
and property."12

Risk of a Terrorist Attack at the Olympics with IEDs
The ability of a lone-wolf actor to hide within the population and strike
with the intent to inflict the greatest amount of carnage possible is but one
challenge for Olympic security forces. The ultimate challenge will be to
detect and neutralize his weapon of choice—the improvised explosive
device.
Since the commencement of combat operations in Afghanistan and the
morphing into counterinsurgency operations, coalition forces have faced
a growing threat from increasingly sophisticated IEDs. With an enormous
stockpile of Soviet-era weapons, Taliban and al-Qaida fighters initially
possessed an endless supply of high explosives derived mainly from abandoned bombs, projectiles and landmines from the failed Soviet Afghan
campaign. In the initial stages of the recent Afghan war, the majority of
IEDs were crudely built and initiated by command wires requiring the
bombers to be in the same vicinity of their targets. Often these devices
would be concealed in concrete barriers, deceased livestock, and other
inanimate objects. As coalition forces developed counter-IED tactics,
insurgent and terrorist bomb makers improved their construction methods by employing remote wireless firing devices and other electronic components. Tactical use of these weapons also changed with the recruitment
and deployment of suicide bombers who target their victims with body
bombs or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devises (VBIED). The message to be taken from Afghanistan in relation to the 2010 Olympics is that
al-Qaida terrorists or their proxies are capable of exporting their bombmaking expertise and their capabilities abroad to strike in Canada.

How Should the Threat to the Vancouver Olympics
Mitigated?
The violent and radical ideology of al-Qaida and its decentralized sympathizers who are engaged in the insurgency in Afghanistan present a clear
and present danger to the security and safety of the 2010 Winter Olympics. There are numerous terrorism plots that have recently been discovered in Canada and the United States that illustrate the capability and
desire of such terrorists to strike domestic targets with the use of explo57
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sive devices. The most severe threat facing the Olympics is in the form of
IEDs, which can be concealed, transported and delivered by a lone-wolf
terrorist inspired and supported by elements of al-Qaida to a populated
and hard-to-secure public open area or venue much in the same manner
that Eric Rudolf attacked the Atlanta Olympic Centennial Park.
One critical approach to mitigate the terrorist threat during the Olympics
is for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to adopt and integrate counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies learned from the Canadian
Forces (CF) fighting in Afghanistan. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
face many challenges in developing a learning culture to combat IEDs in
particular. All organizations "acquire personalities over time" and
"develop abilities in certain areas to accomplish the tasks of the organization but are constrained by their experience to innovate only within the
self-defined parameters of what they see as their purpose."13 The necessity to develop a counterterrorism/counterinsurgency strategy for the
upcoming 2010 Olympics Games requires a new mindset in domestic
policing operations, and must take into account global terrorism, not just
homegrown perpetrators.

Conclusion
Preventing the repeat of an Atlanta-style bombing will require the partnership of both public and private sector security agencies, and the cooperation of the general public to observe and report suspicious persons and
activities. The tendency for public security agencies to work in "silos,"
self-contained administrative hierarchies with little or no contact with
other hierarchies, could be the downfall to a secure and safe 2010 Olympic games.
Hopefully, any terror threat to the Olympic Games will be extinguished
before it can be initiated, but the threat is very real. Although efforts to
secure the games have been going on for a considerable time and have
continued to test the capacity of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, it
must also be recognized that the Canada and its citizens have yet to be
baptized by fire as the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, India, the United
States and other victim nations of recent terrorist attacks.
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